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I. Introduction 
“Derivatives are financial weapons of mass destruction, 
carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal.”1 
Warren Buffet made this statement to Berkshire shareholders in 
2002.2 The potential threat of the derivatives market was known 
then and became real in 2008. Now the government is taking 
action to control it.  
The financial crisis of 2008 was one of the largest in 
American history and almost led to the collapse of the U.S. 
financial system.3 Factors likely contributing to the crisis include 
the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the influx of foreign money, 
the popularity of hedge funds and private equity, and the rise of 
mortgage-backed securities.4 Although the financial crisis of 2008 
had numerous causes, the over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
market was one of the most noted.5  
                                                                                                     
 1. Letter from Warren Buffet, Chairman of Bd., Berkshire Hathaway, 
Inc., to S’holder, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb. 23, 2003) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 2. See Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New ‘Ticking Bomb’ Buffet and 
Gross Warn: $516 Trillion Bubble is a Disaster Waiting to Happen, 
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/derivatives-
are-the-new-ticking-time-bomb (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) (discussing how the 
derivatives market grew from $100 trillion in 2002, at the time Warren Buffett’s 
letter was written, to $516 trillion in 2007, the year prior to the financial crisis) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse 
College: Four Questions About the Financial Crisis (April 14, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 4. See William Spencer Topham, Re-regulating “Financial Weapons of 
Mass Destruction,” Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act and Future Derivative Regulation, 47 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 
133, 135 (2010) (listing suspected causes of the 2008 financial crisis).  
 5. See ALAN N. RECHTSCHAFFEN, CAPITAL MARKETS, DERIVATIVES AND THE 
LAW, 173–74 (2009) (explaining the risks associated with credit derivatives that 
posed many issues for AIG in 2008, ultimately leading to the corporation’s 
government bailout); Jeremy Gogel, Shifting Risk to the Dumbest Guy in the 
Room—Derivatives Regulation After the Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act, 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 30–31 (2010) (addressing the role that the 
derivatives market, especially credit default swaps, played in the 2008 financial 
crisis); Zachary J. Gubler, The Financial Innovation Process: Theory and 
Application, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 55, 87–89 (2011) (explaining that OTC 
derivatives contributed to the financial crisis by “laying the foundation for faulty 
risk modeling and by contributing to bank-like runs”). 
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Some say that the OTC market’s influence on the financial 
crisis was a result of the market’s large financial volume and a 
lack of corresponding government regulation.6 As of July 2010, 
the OTC derivatives market had a notional value of 
approximately $300 trillion in the United States.7 This amount is 
roughly twenty times the size of the American economy.8 The 
notional amount is a way in which derivatives are priced, but it 
does not consider the risk involved.9 This risk can be much 
smaller or larger than the notional contract amount.10 Because 
this market is large and rapidly growing, regulation is necessary 
but will never completely eliminate the risks the market poses 
because of the complexity of the contracts and the rate of 
innovation in the market.11 
The widespread use of OTC derivatives for speculative 
purposes exposes market participants to systemic risk.12 Systemic 
risk arises when investors hold highly leveraged positions that 
could trigger a crisis like that of 2008.13 Due to the number of 
                                                                                                     
 6. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and 
Why Re-Regulating Them Can Prevent Another 1 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law-Econ 
Research, Paper No. 09-13) [hereinafter Stout, Deregulating Derivatives] 
(theorizing that the banking system failure in 2008 was caused primarily by the 
deregulation of the derivatives market in 2000); see also infra Part IV.A 
(providing a background on past derivatives regulation and why the government 
chose not to act until the 2008 crisis).   
 7. See The Role of Derivatives in the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the 
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, 2 (July 1, 2010) (statement of Gary Gensler, 
Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n) [hereinafter Gary Gensler 
Testimony]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-94-133, FINANCIAL 
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEMS 35 (1994) 
[hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See Henry T.C. Hu, Hedging Expectations: “Derivative Reality” and the 
Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 TEX. L. REV. 985, 1013–14 
(explaining how the unprecedented rate of financial innovation in the OTC 
market is largely due to persons with quantitative or physical science 
backgrounds playing vital roles in pricing the contracts). 
 12. See Laurin C. Ariail, The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act: The Impact of Dodd–Frank on End-Users Hedging 
Commercial Risk in Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets, 15 N.C. BANKING 
INST. 175, 179–80 (2011) (discussing the risks that the OTC derivatives market 
poses to market participants and the financial economy as a whole). 
 13. See Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of 
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OTC contracts and their interconnection with other trading 
instruments, a small market shift in the value of an OTC 
derivative could lead to a major international liquidity problem.14 
OTC derivatives enhance systemic risk dramatically because they 
lack transparency.15 Improving transparency in the OTC market 
is precisely why regulation and disclosure are necessary for all 
participants.  
To protect the economy from systemic risk, Congress passed 
the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act16 (Dodd–Frank) in an effort to increase transparency, 
regulate pricing in the derivatives market, and, most 
importantly, minimize the risk to the American people.17 Title VII 
of Dodd–Frank proposes guidelines that the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the U.S. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission (CFTC) are required to follow when 
promulgating regulations for the derivatives market.18 One of the 
most important changes Dodd–Frank requires is the formulation 
of a clearing organization for OTC derivatives, particularly 
swaps.19  
The regulation for clearing organizations requires market 
participants to set initial margin requirements, post or recover 
collateral at the end of each day, and provide certain disclosures 
that were previously not required.20 This only applies to “swap 
                                                                                                     
Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CINN. L. REV. 1019, 1040 (2010) (discussing how the 
size of the credit default swap market could cause a ripple effect throughout 
financial markets even when only one small thing goes awry). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 179–80 (indicating that the opaqueness of 
the market is a major risk associated with the OTC market).   
 16. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 711–774, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641–1802 [hereinafter Dodd–
Frank]. 
 17. See Testimony Concerning the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Markets 
Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 4173 Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 111th Cong. 
164 (Sept. 22, 2009) (statement of Mary Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n) [hereinafter Schapiro]. 
 18. Dodd–Frank § 717.   
 19. Id. § 725. This section pertains specifically to CFTC’s jurisdiction over 
non-security based swaps. Id. 
 20. CFTC General Regulations and Derivatives Clearing Organizations 
Rule, 17 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 39 (2010). 
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dealers” and “major swap participants.”21 These definitions apply 
to participants who hold large positions that would create 
substantial counterparty exposure and increase the threat of 
systemic risk.22  
When defining these terms, the CFTC examined the 
appropriate risk factors associated with these users and the role 
they allegedly played in the 2008 financial crisis.23 Nonfinancial 
corporations who participate in the market, commonly classified 
as “end-users,” are not subject to the mandatory clearing of 
swaps.24 An end-user is a corporation that utilizes the OTC 
market to enter into customized contracts that hedge an already 
exposed risk, such as fluctuation in interest rates or foreign 
currency.25 A survey of the world’s largest 500 companies 
revealed that 94% of them use the derivatives market as end-
users to manage and hedge business risk.26 Thus, a large number 
of market participants are not subject to regulation.  
The end-user exception defines end-users narrowly and 
provides minimal regulation requirements.27 It applies to a 
nonfinancial entity that is a participant and uses swaps to hedge 
or mitigate commercial risk.28 The only real requirement for end-
users is to elect the exception and then notify the Commission as 
to how it will generally meet its financial obligation.29  
                                                                                                     
 21. Id. 77 Fed. Reg. 30596 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1) 
provides a definition of “swap dealer,” “security-based swap dealer,” “major 
swap participant,” and “major security-based swap participant.”  
 22. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5907 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Blanche Lincoln) (stating that when defining major swap participant, the CFTC 
should consider the risk factors associated with holding a substantial position in 
the OTC market).  
 23. See id.  
 24. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2012). 
 25. See infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text (introducing the corporate 
end-user and its role in the OTC market).  
 26. See ISDA Survey Results: Derivatives Usage by the World’s Largest 
Companies, ISDA NEWS RELEASE (Apr. 22, 2009), http://www2.isda.org/ 
functional-areas/research/surveys/end-user-surveys (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter ISDA NEWS RELEASE] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 27. See 17 C.F.R. pt. 39 (2012).   
 28. Id. 
 29. Id.; see infra Part V.A for an in-depth description of the end-user 
exception. 
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Commercial end-users disfavor the narrow interpretation 
and the minimal level of regulation that it imposes.30 Commercial 
end-users wanted the CFTC to broadly cast the definition of end-
user to include affiliate companies who utilize the market and, 
further, allow commercial end-users to hedge risk in the OTC 
market with minimal transaction costs.31 This Note examines the 
CFTC’s rule pertaining to the end-user exception and analyzes 
whether the CFTC’s narrow interpretation is the most beneficial 
approach. This Note proposes that the CFTC broaden the end-
user definition to exempt more users, such as small banks and 
corporate affiliates.32 But to broaden the exception, this Note 
argues that regulators must impose stricter disclosure and 
reporting requirements to monitor the market for abuse of the 
exception. The end-user exemption’s aim is to maintain low 
transaction costs, but regulators must monitor closely the 
potential abuse of this exception. The risk is that participants 
could disguise speculative uses of the market in the form of bona-
fide hedging. 
This Note emphasizes the CFTC’s definition of end-user 
because the CFTC has jurisdiction over all commodity-based 
swaps (including interest rate swaps), options, and futures.33 
Based on statistics from the Bank of International Settlements, 
interest rate contracts on the OTC market comprised 78% of all 
                                                                                                     
 30. Letter from Mark Magnesen, Sr. Vice President & Treasurer, Kraft 
Foods Inc., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y of the Comm’n, CFTC (Feb. 11, 2011) 
[hereinafter Kraft Foods Letter] (providing commentary to proposed rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 80474, in favor of a broad end-user exception and less regulation of 
end-users) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 31. See id. at 6–7 (addressing the particular concerns Kraft Foods, Inc. has 
pertaining to the definition of the end-user).  
 32. See id. at 2 (discussing how Kraft’s affiliate corporations utilize the 
OTC derivative market as agents for Kraft and Kraft’s subsidiary companies to 
hedge exposed market risk). Kraft has a complex structure that calls for two 
affiliate companies to enter into swap transactions with Kraft, its subsidiary 
corporations, and at times, swap dealers. Id. Due to the affiliate corporations’ 
active participation in the OTC market, Kraft submitted a comment to the 
CFTC end-user exception to guarantee that the affiliate’s participation and use 
would fall within the definition of end-user. See id. at 4–5. 
 33. See 156 Cong. Rec. 105, S5293 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of 
Sen. Blanche Lincoln) (stating that non-narrow-based security index swaps and 
credit default swaps may be the only swaps that will fall within the jurisdiction 
of the SEC). 
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outstanding contracts on the market in June 2011.34 Because 
interest rate contracts are highly traded among OTC market 
participants, especially end-users, this Note examines how the 
CFTC approaches the regulation.35 
Part II of this Note provides an overview of the OTC 
derivatives market. It introduces the different kinds of contracts 
traded in the OTC market and elaborates on the type of risks 
associated with the OTC market. Part III examines who qualifies 
as an end-user and how they utilize the market. Part IV gives a 
brief history of past regulation in the OTC derivative market. It 
also introduces Title VII of Dodd–Frank and the requirements it 
imposes on the OTC market, especially end-users.  
Although it is vital that commercial end-users have the 
ability to hedge risk with individualized contracts at minimized 
costs, a narrow exception with minimal regulation is not in the 
American public’s best interest. Part V introduces alternative 
approaches to regulating OTC derivatives. This Note argues that 
the regulation should exempt end-users, but that the current 
requirements of end-users are not sufficient to meet Title VII’s 
aims to promote transparency in the OTC market and to protect 
the American public from systemic risk. This Note tackles the 
question of how broad to make the end-user definition and how to 
then regulate those falling within the definition. This Note 
argues for a broader definition to accommodate the number of 
users who cannot afford to participate in the market if subjected 
to mandatory clearing requirements.36  
Part VI proposes that end-users should comply with 
stringent disclosure and reporting requirements in order not to 
exacerbate another financial crisis. The proposed disclosure 
model mirrors the ISDA’s Master Agreement, a standard form 
agreement already used by a number of market participants.37 
                                                                                                     
 34. See Bank for Int’l Settlements, Semiannual OTC Derivatives Statistics 
at End-June 2011, http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm (last visited Sept. 
27, 2012) (providing a table of the amounts outstanding of OTC derivatives by 
instrument) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 35. See ISDA End-User Survey: Interest Rate Swaps (Oct. 2010), 
http://www2.isda.org/functional-areas/research/surveys/end-user-surveys (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2012) [hereinafter ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps] (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30.  
 37. See infra notes 131–34 and accompanying text (introducing the ISDA 
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The goal is to strike a balance between a broad end-user 
exemption and protecting the market from users abusing this 
exception through speculation and highly leveraged bets. This 
Note argues that such a balance is achievable so long as 
regulators demand more disclosure of end-users, particularly in 
regard to their ability to meet financial obligations. This will 
promote transparency and allow regulators to easily monitor 
abuse of the exception. While this Note acknowledges that the 
rapidly changing face of financial innovation in the OTC 
derivatives market makes it difficult for regulators to implement 
an efficient regulatory scheme, this Note’s proposal could 
nevertheless work by adapting disclosure requirements to 
changes in financial innovation.  
II. Over-the-Counter Derivative Market 
A. Market Overview 
A derivative contract is “a bilateral contract or payments 
exchange agreement whose value derives . . . from the value of an 
underlying asset or underlying reference rate or index.”38 
Derivatives are traded in two kinds of markets: exchanges and 
OTC markets.39 This Note focuses on the OTC market where 
contracts are bilaterally negotiated collateral agreements with 
flexible terms that mature over time.40 
The OTC market consists of privately negotiated and traded 
agreements.41 These market characteristics enable market 
participants to tailor derivative contracts to their specific needs.42 
                                                                                                     
Master Agreement).  
 38. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 159 (citing Procter & Gamble Co. 
v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270, 1275 (S.D. Ohio 1996)).   
 39. Randall Dodd, The Structure of OTC Derivatives Markets, 9 THE 
FINANCIER 1, 1–4 (2002).  
 40. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 163 (listing the main points of 
how exchange-traded and OTC markets differ).  
 41. See id. at 162–63 (discussing the difference between derivative 
exchange markets, which are designed to eliminate counterparty risk by 
standardizing contracts, and OTC markets, which increase counterparty risk 
and illiquidity due to the contracts’ individualized terms). 
 42. See id. (describing how the flexibility of OTC contracts enables 
participants to transact for what they need).  
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This market appeals to commercial users hedging risk and 
noncommercial investors speculating in the market to obtain 
large profits.43 Although derivatives contracts allow participants 
to obtain large arbitrage profits and hedge exposed risks, they 
have a potentially large downside.  
The resulting losses from Long Term Capital Management’s 
(LTCM) failure in 1998 and the AIG bailout in 2008 revealed this 
downside.44 These failures presented issues of counterparty credit 
risk.45  AIG sold credit derivatives in the OTC market that 
essentially insured corporate credit.46 AIG, a dealer of credit 
default swaps, was able to undertake a great amount of exposure 
in the OTC market by selling insurance on the risk of default 
where the underlying asset was a mortgage-backed security.47 
Unfortunately, such contracts required large payments to 
counterparties when the subject of the credit default swap 
worsened.48 With the decrease in credit ratings in 2008 due to the 
downfall of the economy, AIG became responsible for posting 
collateral to numerous outstanding credit default swap 
contracts.49 Due to the multiple positions AIG held in credit 
default swaps, the company could not meet all of the collateral 
                                                                                                     
 43. See, e.g., EMILIOS AVGOULEAS, THE MECHANICS AND REGULATION OF 
MARKET ABUSE 43 (2005) (listing why the derivatives market is attractive to 
different users). 
 44. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 160–62 (discussing the systemic 
risk effects of the failure of LTCM, Bear Stearns, and AIG due to their large 
speculative positions in the OTC markets). 
 45. See id. (describing the effect of one party defaulting on its contract due 
to failure and shifting the risk to the counterparty). This dislocation of risk has 
a great impact on the market, and will likely create a ripple effect for the 
economy as a whole. Id. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 87–88 (stating that AIG 
underwrote approximately $80 billion in notional amount of credit default 
swaps derived from mortgage-backed securities).   
 46. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 173–74 (providing a brief 
overview of how AIG was able to insure multiple times the value of the 
outstanding credit of the companies subject to the transaction). Market 
participants use credit default swaps to transfer credit risk to another party at a 
set cost. Id. at 179. 
 47. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 87–88 (discussing the role of OTC 
derivatives and AIG in the 2008 financial crisis).   
 48. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 173–74. 
 49. See David A. Skeel & Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and 
the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 165–66 (2012) 
(providing an overview of the role derivatives played in AIG’s bailout).  
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demands and turned to the government to help meet its 
obligations, avoiding a worse crisis than the nation was already 
facing.50 
Participants in the OTC market, especially major 
participants and dealers, hold large positions.51 If one party was 
to default, the loss endured by the counterparties to all of their 
derivative contracts could disrupt market functioning.52 This fear 
of disruption is exactly why the government intervened on 
multiple occasions to bail out financial institutions and related 
entities.53 While speculation is not normally pertinent to end-
users, this Note proposes the idea that minimally regulated end-
users could manipulate the exception and speculate while 
claiming the hedging exemption.54 The general problem of 
distinguishing between hedging and speculation is a difficult 
task.55 In May 2012, JPMorgan Chase lost $2 billion over a six 
week period in a trading portfolio used to hedge risks to which 
the company exposed itself.56 This shows how transactions 
designed to hedge exposed risk could seem like speculation and 
result in large losses.57  
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. at 166 (stating that the only other alternative for AIG would 
have been bankruptcy, which would have left the counterparties to the swap 
transactions with no way to receive collateral payments).  
 51. See id. at 162 (stating that if the Federal Reserve did not facilitate the 
private sector recapitalization, then counterparties’ losses could have been 
somewhere from $3 billion to $5 billion).   
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. at 163–66. 
 54. See infra note 209 and accompanying text (discussing how the lack of 
disclosure proposed by the end-user exception does not effectively enable 
regulators to monitor the market for abuse of the exception). 
 55. See Roy Kreitner, Speculations of Contract, or How Contract Law 
Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love Risk, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1096, 1097 
(2000) (presenting the question of how to distinguish between allocation of risk 
and gambling). 
 56. See Dawn Kopecki, Michael J. Moore, & Christine Harper, JPMorgan 
Loses $2 Billion on Unit’s ‘Egregious Mistakes’ (May 11, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-11/jpmorgan-loses-2-billion-as-
mistakes-trounce-hedges.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 57. See id. (“Concern [is] ‘that a large, supposedly sophisticated institution, 
even something called a ‘hedge’ can contain all kinds of hidden risks that the 
senior people don’t understand.’”). 
DO END-USERS GET THE BEST OF BOTH WORLDS? 1769 
Speculation in the derivatives market is a dangerous 
endeavor because the market exposes investors to a large amount 
of risk from highly leveraged bets.58 By imposing minimal 
regulation on end-users, transparency in the market is not 
achieved and bad actors can more easily hide trading activities 
from regulators.59 This is why regulators should subject these 
participants to more stringent disclosure and reporting 
requirements.  
Another common characteristic of derivatives is the amount 
of leverage on which these instruments are traded. Leverage 
allows one to make an investment with little or no upfront 
monetary payment.60 In the OTC derivatives market, no 
exchange of funds may be required until maturity or 
performance.61 This enables an investor to hold exponentially 
larger positions than the amount committed.62 Although, in 
theory, this seems ideal because it reduces risk, in reality, 
leverage amplifies risk by spreading and multiplying it among 
multiple complex financial transactions, creating systemic 
hazards.63  
Because of these complex characteristics, derivatives can be 
extremely dangerous, not only to the OTC market, but to the 
economy as a whole. This potential danger stems largely from 
“users’ lack of knowledge and their under appreciation of the 
                                                                                                     
 58. See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and 
Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L. J. 701, 772 
(1999) (discussing how speculation in the derivatives market is sometimes cheap 
and encourages investors to accept uncompensated risk). Stout introduces the 
idea that derivatives speculation increases systemic risk because of the number 
of financial firms exposing themselves to a great level of risk. Id.   
 59. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 165 (stating the importance that some 
sort of regulatory framework exists to monitor those who could abuse the OTC 
market and increase the threat of systemic risk).  
 60. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 164 (introducing the concept of 
leverage and how it is beneficial to transactions in the derivatives market). 
 61. See id. (pointing out how an OTC derivative may not require any 
advancement until maturity, whereas an exchange-traded derivative requires a 
margin). See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text for a description of 
margin.  
 62. See Topham, supra note 4, at 139–40 (discussing how financial leverage 
in the derivatives market can lead to an increased ability to take risks, therefore 
raising the chances of failure and systemic risk).  
 63. Id. at 140. 
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risks involved.”64 This factor caused a number of losses stemming 
from derivatives use, including the economic crisis of 2008.65 
B. Types of OTC Contracts 
1. Options 
An option contract gives “the purchaser the right to buy (call 
option) or sell (put option) a specified quantity of a commodity or 
financial asset at a particular price (exercise price) on or before a 
certain future date.”66 Option contracts function by having the 
purchaser pay the seller (writer) an option premium for the right 
to buy or sell.67 The purchaser’s loss is limited to the price of the 
premium, enabling the purchaser to limit the downside of 
investment.68 In contrast, the seller of an option receives the 
premium in return for risk exposure.69  
Like other derivatives, options may serve as hedging and 
speculating instruments, but, most importantly, options enable a 
buyer to eliminate all downside risk by paying a premium 
upfront.70 Options do not expose the owner of an option to market 
risk because they create only a right to buy or sell, not an 
obligation.71 Options do expose the seller to some risk associated 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Edward A. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivative 
Use: Advocating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 595, 629 (2000) (introducing the use of derivatives and regulatory 
structures applicable to derivatives in 2000).  
 65. See id. at 629–30 (stating how users’ lack of knowledge caused a 
number of financial losses in the 1990s, but these losses resulted in few 
lawsuits). 
 66. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 27.  
 67. Id. 
 68. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 170–71 (discussing the operation 
and use of options).  
 69. See id.  
 70. See id. (noting that downside risk of an option is shifted completely to 
the seller). 
 71. See id. at 171 (explaining that the owner of an option is exposed to no 
market risk and, if they choose not to exercise an option, then they only lose the 
price of the premium). 
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with the underlying asset.72 The seller can hedge this risk, 
however, by investing in the underlying asset.73 
2. Forwards 
A forward contract “obligate[s] the holder to buy or sell a 
specific underlying [asset] at a specified price, quantity, and date 
in the future.”74 Forwards are customized contracts that allow 
market participants to hedge assets and liabilities by locking in a 
future purchase or sale price.75 For example, if a U.S. importer 
plans to buy a product at a future date for a price quoted in a 
foreign currency, the U.S. importer can enter into a forward 
contract to fix the U.S. dollar cost of the product.76 This allows 
the U.S. importer to hedge against currency fluctuations between 
the purchase and delivery dates.77 Alternatively, market 
participants use forwards to speculate on market movements and 
profit from decreases or increases in future prices or rates.78  
3. Swaps 
A swap is a complex instrument traded on the OTC market.79 
In a swap agreement, “two parties agree to exchange ‘cash flows’ 
on a ‘notional amount’ over a period of time in the future.”80 This 
notional amount is a reference upon which the payment stream is 
                                                                                                     
 72. See id. (looking to how sellers of an option contract can limit their 
exposure to market risk).  
 73. See id. 
 74. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 26 (defining a forward and describing 
the instrument’s use in the market). 
 75. See id. at 26 (providing an example of how a hedging participant could 
benefit from using a customized forward contract). 
 76. See id. at 5 (providing an example of how a party would utilize a 
forward contract).  
 77. See id.  
 78. See id. at 27 (discussing how a speculator attempts to profit in the 
forwards market). 
 79. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 172. 
 80. See id. (looking at swap agreements and discussing the characteristics 
of such contracts).  
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derived.81 A commonly transacted swap is the interest rate swap, 
which allows counterparties to exchange a fixed rate for a floating 
rate.82 For example, Party A invests in a bond with a par value of 
$1000 and a fixed interest rate of 5% compounded annually.83 
Party B, however, owns a bond that pays a floating interest rate 
tied to the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR).84 Party B 
may prefer a more steady interest payment to hedge against the 
risk of a decreasing interest rate.85 Party A, however, may want 
to trade his steady interest payment for a potentially larger 
interest payment.86 If the two enter into an interest rate swap, 
then Party A is guaranteed his annual interest payment of $50 
plus any additional profit over $50 on the two bonds.87 Party B, 
on the other hand, is always guaranteed $50.88 Party B pays any 
amount over $50 to Party A, while Party A, in turn, compensates 
Party B for any loss under $50.89 
Because swaps are traded on the OTC market, parties can 
negotiate a contract that specifically reflects their needs, whether 
                                                                                                     
 81. See id. at 175 (describing the elements of a swap transaction prior to an 
overview of the types of swap transactions most frequently used in the market). 
Common transactions include interest rate swaps, currency swaps, and credit-
default swaps. Id.   
 82. See id. at 175–77 (setting out how a “plain vanilla” interest rate swap 
works and provides benefits to the counterparties); see also Gogel, supra note 5, 
at 8–9 (providing a hypothetical example of how an interest rate swap works). 
These described transactions are constructed similarly to other swap contracts. 
Id.   
 83. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 8–9 (depicting this example). 
 84. See id. (Party B has a floating interest rate payment and wants to 
guarantee a specific payment so he transacts with Party A, who wishes to 
increase his guaranteed payment). For a description of LIBOR, see British 
Banking Ass’n, Understanding BBA LIBOR, (Jan. 8, 2011), http:// 
www.bba.org.uk/media/article/understanding-bba-libor (last visited Sept. 27, 
2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). LIBOR is the London 
Interbank Offered Rate, which reflects the rate at which banks, such as the U.S. 
Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank, borrow money from one 
another daily. Id.  
 85. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 8–9.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id.  
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to hedge exposed credit risk from an owned asset or to profit by 
speculating on pricing inefficiencies in the market.90 
Swaps enable extreme flexibility to meet the contracting 
parties’ needs, but, concurrently, expose these parties to high 
credit risk.91 Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty to the 
transaction will default on the contract.92 Ideally, credit risk is 
reflected in the contractual terms, but, due to information 
asymmetry, this is not always achievable.93 AIG’s issuance of 
multiple credit default swaps and inability to meet financial 
obligations when they became due provides a picture of how 
asymmetrical information can have damaging effects.94 After the 
2008 financial crisis, regulators set out to address these risks and 
pricing inefficiencies within the OTC swap market.95 The next 
portion of this Note examines commercial end-users’ role in the 
swap market and how proposed legislation may affect their 
participation. 
III. End-User Participation in the OTC Market 
End-users are a category of market participants that utilize 
the OTC market to hedge exposed market risk and minimize 
volatility of their overall earnings.96 This category mainly 
                                                                                                     
 90. See Mark A. Guinn & William L. Harvey, Taking OTC Derivative 
Contracts as Collateral, 57 BUS. LAW. 1127, 1132 (2002) (explaining that OTC 
derivatives are used for both speculation and hedging, but they are more 
commonly used for hedging purposes). 
 91. See RECHTSCHAFFEN, supra note 5, at 172. 
 92. See Adams & Runkle, supra note 64, at 663 (providing a description of 
credit risk and how to manage it).  
 93. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 5 (discussing how lack of transparency in 
the market and nondisclosure between counterparties leaves regulators and 
participants unaware of potential risks building up in the financial market). 
This is a problem that Title VII of the Dodd–Frank Act aims to address. See 
Schapiro, supra note 17, at 165.  
 94. See supra notes 44–50 and accompanying text for a brief overview of 
the AIG bailout.  
 95. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 164 (discussing the goals of Dodd–
Frank with respect to regulating the OTC derivate market). 
 96. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES: A TRANSACTION APPROACH 10 (Jonathan 
Denton ed., 2006) (“Derivatives are typically used by corporate end users to 
reduce or extinguish their exposure to discrete risks and thus reduce the 
volatility of their earnings.”); Adams & Runkle, supra note 64, at 674 (“When 
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includes nonfinancial corporations, but asset managers and other 
financial institutions also qualify.97 These users, and their 
investors, benefit greatly from using the OTC market to hedge 
risk.  
For example, Shell Co. takes positions in the U.S. energy 
derivatives market to respond to internal forecasts of supply and 
demand, enabling Shell to be ahead of foreseeable price 
movements.98 It also participates in the swap market to offset 
credit risk and assist actual transactions.99 Kraft Foods employs 
risk management strategies to handle risks associated with 
volatility in interest rates, commodity prices, and foreign 
currency rates that entail entering into forward, option, and swap 
contracts.100 
Although a positive duty to hedge exposed risks may not 
exist, at least one court found that the board of directors of a 
company owes its shareholders a duty of care to instruct 
managers adequately about the use of hedging with 
derivatives.101 Such a ruling demonstrates that hedging in the 
derivatives market is a common practice among corporations, and 
it is in a board’s best interest to examine whether it is beneficial 
for a corporation to take this risk management route.102 
                                                                                                     
properly used to hedge against risk, derivatives are an essential corporate 
tool.”). 
 97. See ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 35 (providing a list of 
categories of survey respondents).  
 98. See Letter from Robert Reilley, Vice President – Regulatory Affairs, 
Shell Energy North Am. (US), L.P., to David A. Stawick, Sec’y of the Comm’n, 
CFTC (June 21, 2011) [hereinafter Shell Letter] (listing the ways in which Shell 
Co. utilizes the derivative market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 99. See id. 
 100.  See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30 (describing how Kraft Foods and 
its affiliate companies utilize the derivative market).  
 101. See Brane v. Roth, 590 N.E. 2d 587, 591–93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 
(concluding that the board of directors failed “to attain knowledge of the basic 
fundamentals of hedging to be able to direct the hedging activities and supervise 
the manager properly”).  
 102. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 13 (discussing the court’s 
finding in Brane v. Roth and a corporation’s duty to hedge or, at a minimum, 
look to the mechanics of such a trade to determine if it is within the best 
interests of the corporation). 
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Companies, as mentioned previously, use the derivative market 
to manage risk and optimize value.103  
The OTC market enables end-users to tailor their derivative 
contracts to their needs.104 High negotiation costs of OTC 
derivatives contracts makes trading on the market costly.105 But 
this is the price end-users pay for a uniquely tailored contract. 
Prior to Dodd–Frank, participants in the market enjoyed the 
added benefit of no margin requirements.106 
According to a 2010 International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association (ISDA) survey, end-users stated that they use the 
OTC derivatives market primarily for interest rate swaps, 
currency swaps, credit default swaps, equity swaps, and energy 
swaps.107 The results show that 80% use the OTC market for 
interest rate swaps, 59% for currency swaps, 27% for credit 
default swaps, 25% for equity swaps, and 32% for 
energy/commodity swaps.108 The ISDA classified end-users as 
companies utilizing the market to manage exposed risk.109 The 
group included nonfinancial corporations, asset managers, and 
other financial institutions.110 These instruments are so widely 
                                                                                                     
 103. See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30; see also Shell Letter, supra note 
98 (discussing for what purposes Shell uses the derivative market and how the 
proposed end-user definition will affect Shell’s ability to utilize the market via 
its subsidiary companies).  
 104. See Thomas C. Singher, Note, Regulating Derivatives: Does 
Transnational Regulatory Cooperation Offer a Viable Alternative to 
Congressional Action?, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1397, 1406–08 (1995) (addressing 
the uses of the derivatives market to commercial users). One of the uses 
discussed is speculation, which, although not common for end-users, supports an 
argument to regulate these participants in some fashion. Id. at 1410–11. 
 105. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 9 (stating that swap contracts tend to have 
high transaction costs due to the extensive negotiations over delivering a party’s 
specific needs).  
 106. See infra notes 122–28 and accompanying text for a description on 
Dodd–Frank’s margin requirements. 
 107. See ISDA Survey: Interest Rate Swaps, supra note 35, at 2 (listing 
results from a survey of 295 respondents from North America and Europe who 
use the OTC derivatives market).  
 108. See id. 
 109. See id. The ISDA study includes more than just nonfinancial entities 
utilizing the OTC market for hedging exposed risks. Id. This Note proposes that 
the regulatory definition of end-user should include those surveyed as end-users 
by the ISDA.  
 110. See id. 
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used because companies across all industries utilize interest rate 
swaps and currency swaps.111 Specific industries utilize 
commodity, equity, and credit derivatives.112 For example, 
financial industries primarily use equity and credit derivatives, 
while companies focusing on utilities and basic materials utilize 
commodity derivatives.113 
Because end-users typically use the OTC market specifically 
for hedging exposed market risk, Congress excluded these users 
from regulation under Title VII of Dodd–Frank.114 If mandatory 
clearing pertained to end-users, they would be required to post 
margin and use clearinghouses for all of their trades.115 This 
would increase the cost of using the OTC market and drive many 
end-users away from the market. As a result, corporate end-users 
would hedge their risks in nonbeneficial ways, such as through 
insurance contracts that increase transaction costs, which the 
corporation passes on to the consumers and investors.116 
Although increased costs will drive end-users from the 
market, imposing minimal regulation for end-users is not the 
proper solution. It is possible that end-users are attracted to the 
market not only because of low transaction costs, but also because 
of the lack of regulation. Although most end-users are utilizing 
the market for hedging purposes, misusing these instruments is 
easy due to their complexity and large potential gains.117 For 
                                                                                                     
 111. See ISDA NEWS RELEASE, supra note 26, at 2 (breaking down results of 
a 2009 survey of end-user participation in the OTC derivative market by 
industry and country).  
 112. See id. at 4 (displaying a chart of the survey results broken down by 
industry sector and usage of each type of swap contract).  
 113. See id.  
 114. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 189 (explaining that Congress’s rationale 
for excluding end-users from regulation stemmed from concerns for consumers 
who would suffer through increased costs due to corporations’ inability to hedge 
risk and reduce overall losses). 
 115. See Dodd–Frank § 723, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h); infra Part IV.B (discussing Title 
VII of Dodd–Frank).   
 116. See Letter from Sen. Christopher Dodd & Sen. Blanche Lincoln to Rep. 
Barney Frank & Rep. Colin Peterson (June 30, 2010) (stating Congress’s 
intention in exempting end-users from the market) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 117. See Guinn & Harvey, supra note 90, at 1128, 1130 (commenting on the 
possibility of abuse in the market due to some participant’s lack of knowledge of 
the complex OTC derivatives). 
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example, one claiming the end-user exception could determine a 
way to abuse the exception by disguising speculation as hedging 
and increasing the threat of systemic risk.118 Does exemption from 
Dodd–Frank mandatory clearing provide end-users the best of 
both worlds—virtually no regulation and low transaction costs? 
This Note will analyze whether it is possible to broaden the class of 
end-users and keep the derivatives market attractive to end-users 
by maintaining low transaction costs.   
IV. Regulation of the OTC Market 
A. Past Regulation 
Before introducing the current regulation of the OTC market, 
it is important to discuss briefly the evolution of regulation in the 
derivatives market, specifically of OTC derivatives. The regulatory 
framework of the derivatives market is a combination of the CFTC, 
the SEC, and a number of self-regulatory institutions.119 Although 
traders utilized OTC derivatives for a long period of time, the 
market rose to popularity in the 1980s.120 Due to regulators’ 
unfamiliarity with these new, complex instruments, OTC 
derivatives remained largely unregulated for some time.121 
Originally, regulators focused on preventing manipulation and 
fraud in the derivatives market.122 Because OTC derivatives are 
less susceptible to manipulation, regulators did not see these 
instruments as a threat deserving of regulation.123 Unfortunately, 
                                                                                                     
 118. See infra Part VI.  
 119. See Adam J. Krippel, Note, Regulatory Overhaul of the OTC Derivatives 
Market: The Costs, Risks and Politics, 6 ENTREPREN. BUS. L. J. 269, 278 (2011) 
(providing an overview of regulation in the derivatives market).   
 120. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7 (addressing why the OTC 
market was unregulated prior to 2008).  
 121. See Krippel, supra note 119, at 278. 
 122. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 18–23 (discussing the history of derivative 
regulation from the passage of the CEA in 1936 to the creation of the CFTC in 
1974). Congress attempted to address issues of fraud and manipulation of the 
unregulated market. Id. Ultimately, this led to exempting the OTC derivatives 
from regulations in the 1992 amendments to the CEA, which attracted many 
critics. Id. at 23. 
 123. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-00-00, COMMODITY 
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the 1992 amendments to the 1936 Commodity Exchange Act 
(CEA), which governs regulation of the derivatives market, did 
not completely resolve this issue.124 The 1992 amendments gave 
the CFTC power to exempt OTC derivatives from regulation.125 
Regulators justified nonregulation with the fact that participants 
were self-interested and sufficiently sophisticated to self-
regulate.126 
Because government regulators failed to address issues 
beyond manipulation and fraud, private regulators began 
appearing in the 1990s to increase market transparency and 
disclosure.127 In 1994, the Derivatives Policy Group introduced a 
voluntary oversight framework that would help address the 
public policy issues of the OTC derivatives market.128 Its goal was 
to have more OTC market participants report their use and risk 
exposure in the market.129  
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the 
ISDA have made progress in making the derivatives market more 
transparent and efficient.130 The ISDA uses a form document, 
known as the ISDA Master Agreement, which parties sign prior 
to entering into any derivatives contract.131 The ISDA Master 
                                                                                                     
EXCHANGE ACT – ISSUES RELATED TO THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC TRADING 
SYSTEMS 10 (2009) (discussing how the OTC derivatives market remained 
unregulated because the instruments presented limited market integrity 
concerns). 
 124. See id. Because the OTC derivative market was not as susceptible to 
fraud and manipulation, regulators were not concerned with subjecting them to 
regulation. See id. at 28.  
 125. See id.  
 126. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7. 
 127. See Singher, supra note 104, at 1431–34 (looking at all the different 
private actors who have taken steps to help promote efficiency and transparency 
in the OTC market).  
 128. See generally Derivatives Policy Group, Framework for Voluntary 
Oversight, http://riskinstitute.ch/137790.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) 
(presenting an approach to enhance reporting and evaluation of risk in the OTC 
market) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 129. See id. 
 130. See Singher, supra note 104, at 1431–33 (discussing additional 
regulatory influences on the OTC derivatives market beyond statutory 
guidelines). 
 131. See Frank Partnoy, ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: The Four 
Horsemen of Derivatives Regulation? 5–6 (San Diego Law Sch. Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Working Paper No. 39, 2002) (introducing the ISDA and how it 
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Agreement specifies a number of things, including the obligations 
of the parties and the relevant events of default.132 If the 
standard form contract is unfavorable to one party, it can either 
negotiate this term in each of its contracts or accept the standard 
terms.133 This practice promotes efficiency for members, and the 
documents further provide guidance in judicial decisions.134  
While private groups were encouraging self-regulation, some 
advocated for statutory regulation of the OTC market.135 Though 
OTC derivatives did not pose a risk of manipulation in the late 
1990s when the argument to regulate was introduced, some saw 
that the rapidly changing structure of this market and the recent 
large losses in the market required a regulatory response.136 The 
Government Financial Officers Association presented the idea 
that derivatives posed a bigger threat than the benefit they 
offered.137 Most notably, Brooksley Born, Commissioner of the 
CFTC from 1996–1999, testified before Congress on the perils 
that the derivatives market posed and how regulators should 
address these dangers:138  
                                                                                                     
privately regulates the OTC derivatives market).  
 132. See id. at 6 (outlining what the ISDA Master Agreement and Schedule 
specifies to reduce counterparty risk).  
 133. See Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of a Trade Association: Group 
Interactions Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 211, 254 (2001) (presenting the downside to using the 
ISDA standard form contract).    
 134. See id. at 6–10 (presenting the idea that the ISDA’s private law, 
addressing issues unanticipated by judges and regulators, will continue to be 
used in judicial opinions).   
 135. See CFTC Concept Release, Over-the-Counter Derivatives (May 7, 
1998), http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) 
(proposing a regulatory scheme for the OTC market) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). This proposal was opposed by financial 
regulators, Greenspan and Rubin, who essentially stated that such regulation 
would cause a financial crisis. See Krippel, supra note 119, at 279 (discussing 
the negative reaction to Brooksley Born’s regulatory proposal).  
 136. See Financial Derivatives Supervisory Improvement Act of 1998 and the 
Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market: Hearing on H.R. 4062 Before the H. 
Comm. on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 177 (1998) (statement of 
Brooksley Born, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 4062].  
 137. See GOV’T FIN. OFFICERS ASSOC., 1994 SURVEY OF DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 
IN THE DEBT MARKET 124 (1994).  
 138. See Hearing on H.R. 4062, supra note 136, at 313. 
1780 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1759 (2012) 
Failure to keep pace with the changing market would stifle the 
capacity of U.S. firms to meet global competitive challenges, 
would create a cloud of legal uncertainty over the applicability 
of outdated rules to new products and innovative transactions, 
and would erode the regulatory system’s ability to protect 
customers and to preserve the financial integrity of that 
market.139 
Her proposal considered the clearing of derivatives, OTC 
derivatives market users’ registration and reporting to the CFTC, 
capital requirements, requirement of risk management controls 
for derivatives dealers, and restrictions on dealers’ sale 
practices.140 This idea met strong opposition from other 
regulators who believed that regulation would hinder the 
efficiency of the OTC derivative market.141 
Born’s fear became real in 2008. But, in 1999, proponents for 
deregulation won the day in Congress. Alan Greenspan, then 
Federal Reserve Chairman, claimed that the proposed regulatory 
scheme would “distort the efficiency of [the U.S.] market system 
and as a consequence [impede] growth and improvements in 
standards of living.”142  
With Greenspan’s encouragement, Congress rejected 
regulation of OTC derivatives and passed the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).143 With this Act, Congress 
ensured that the CFTC would not regulate OTC derivatives by 
expressly exempting them from the CFMA legislation.144 
Essentially, the CFMA’s goal was to promote innovation, enhance 
legal certainty, and provide greater stability in the derivatives 
                                                                                                     
 139. Id.  
 140. See CFTC Concept Release, supra note 135. 
 141. See Hearing on the Regulation of OTC Derivatives Before the H. Comm. 
on Banking and Fin. Serv., 105th Cong. 303 (1998) (testimony of Alan 
Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See Reade Everett, Deriving a Solution for Derivative Reform: Proposals 
to Reconstruct the Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. 
L. 479, 483 (2009). 
 144. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(g)(1) (2010) (exempting agreements entered into by 
eligible contract participants that are “subject to individual negotiation by 
parties”). 
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market.145 As a result, private parties could negotiate OTC 
derivatives contracts without being subject to any regulation.146  
Some feel that perhaps Born and Greenspan were both 
wrong in their regulatory endeavors. Lynn Stout argues that the 
deregulation of derivatives led to disaster by making swap 
contracts legally enforceable through the CFMA, which was 
unprecedented.147 Stout proposes a form of self-regulation that 
would hold dealers personally responsible for risky, speculative 
decisions, by making speculative OTC contracts not legally 
enforceable.148 This is how the law viewed derivatives contracts 
prior to 2000 and Stout believes this is the best way to regulate 
now.149 In essence, Lynn Stout’s answer is to treat an OTC swap 
contract as a gambling contract, just as it was once done 
centuries ago.150 This Note will address this idea further in Part 
V.B.1. 
B. Dodd–Frank Regulation 
For years, regulators recognized that the OTC market lacked 
oversight.151 In 1994, the Comptroller General of the United 
States called for uniform regulation of the OTC market.152 In 
                                                                                                     
 145. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 24 (discussing the intention and effect of the 
CFMA).  
 146. See id. (stating the result of deregulation in the OTC market). Gogel 
introduces the idea that deregulation of OTC transactions directly contrasts 
with the intention of the CFMA to promote transparency, decrease systemic 
risk, and provide stability in the market. Id. 
 147. See Stout, Deregulating Derivatives, supra note 6, at 30 (“[The] rule of 
unenforceability encouraged speculators to rely on private ordering and to 
develop and police their own private markets.”). 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id; Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, 
BANKING & FINANCE 34 (Fall 2009) [hereinafter Regulate OTC Derivatives] 
(proposing an idea to treat speculative contracts as gambling contracts to give 
dealers more accountability for their actions). 
 150. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 34–35; see 
infra notes 196–99. 
 151. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 31–32 (“On October 8, 2008, Christopher 
Cox, then Chairman of the SEC, characterized the lack of oversight of the OTC 
derivatives market as a ‘regulatory black hole.’”).  
 152. See GAO REPORT, supra note 9, at 126–27 (“Given the weaknesses and 
gaps that impede regulatory preparedness for dealing with a crisis associated 
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1998, Brooksley Born reaffirmed the importance of regulating 
this vast market.153 Unfortunately, the government did not act to 
regulate the OTC market until it was too late. 
Title VII of Dodd–Frank addresses the regulation of the OTC 
derivatives market, particularly swaps.154 The legislation’s 
overall goal is to lower risk to the American public and to 
promote transparency in the OTC market.155 The major rules that 
the CFTC and SEC are currently promulgating are set out below.  
Dodd–Frank gives the CFTC and the SEC jurisdiction over 
swap regulation.156 The SEC has jurisdiction over security-based 
swaps and the CFTC has exclusive jurisdiction over all 
nonsecurities based swaps, including interest rate swaps and 
currency swaps.157 Dodd–Frank requires the CFTC to coordinate 
with the SEC and other agencies prior to issuing rules or orders 
in connection with swap regulation.158 Dodd–Frank also 
mandates that the CFTC and SEC engage in joint rulemaking to 
define terms, including “swap,” “security-based swap,” “swap 
dealer,” and “major swap participant.”159   
One of the major changes that Dodd–Frank imposes on the 
OTC market is the mandatory clearing of swaps.160 This 
regulatory approach requires all qualifying swaps to be traded 
through a heavily regulated third-party, called a derivatives 
clearing organization (DCO).161 This aims to reduce systemic risk 
                                                                                                     
with derivatives, we recommend that Congress require federal regulation of the 
safety and soundness of all major U.S. OTC derivatives dealers.”).  
 153. See Hearing on H.R. 4062, supra note 136, at 177–78. 
 154. See id. at 40 (introducing different sections of the Financial Reform Act 
and what each section aims to regulate). 
 155. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Discussion Draft: Hearing 
Before H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 2, 5 (2009) (statement of Gary 
Gensler, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 
Hearing].  
 156. Dodd–Frank Act § 722(a). 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id. § 712. 
 159. Id. § 712(d)(1). The definitions of these terms are finalized. See 77 Fed. 
Reg. 30596 (May 23, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).   
 160. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 48–50 (looking at the costs and benefits of 
derivatives clearing).   
 161. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 86–87 (discussing approaches to managing 
counterparty risk and the effects of these approaches, specifically the central 
clearing requirement).  
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by putting OTC transactions on the books of regulated 
clearinghouses and not large financial institutions.162 Central 
clearing also aims to reduce counterparty risk, leading to more 
accurate pricing.163 
Central clearing will require participants, with some 
exceptions, to set initial margin requirements.164 Margin is a cash 
balance in a trader’s account with the clearinghouse.165 If the 
balance in this account falls below a certain amount, the trader 
must post additional collateral to maintain a balance established 
by the clearinghouse.166 A portion of the contract settlement 
amount determines the margin requirement.167 This guarantees 
that parties back up investments with an adequate amount of 
capital.168 Due to uncertainty in derivatives pricing and 
fluctuation of an underlying asset’s price, a trader may be 
required to post a considerable amount of collateral.169 While 
providing upfront collateral is important, it is an incredibly 
thorny topic because of the difficulty in pricing derivatives and 
determining an accurate settlement price on which to base a 
margin calculation.170  
                                                                                                     
 162. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 155, at 4 
(addressing how the clearing organizations will help to lower risk to the 
American public).   
 163. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 92 (explaining how the DCO in the OTC 
market will overcome counterparty risk by providing an example). Although the 
DCO is designed to eliminate counterparty risk and increase transparency, the 
use of a central party clearing may increase costs in obtaining information that 
in the current bilateral framework is not public. Id. at 94. 
 164. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 185 (providing an overview of central party 
clearing in the OTC market). 
 165. See id. at 185 n.74 (explaining briefly the basics of margin).  
 166.  See id.  
 167. See Gogel, supra note 5, at 50 (explaining the purpose of margin 
requirements).  
 168. See id.  
 169. See, e.g., Letter from Darrel E. Issa, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight 
and Gov’t Reform, to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve (July 22, 2011), 
http://thinkprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/IssaLetter.pdf (stating that 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) estimates that the initial 
margin posted in one year will total $2.56 trillion).  
 170. See Gubler, supra note 5, at 105–06 (examining the problems collateral 
requirements may pose for OTC market users).  
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These regulations apply only to swap dealers and major 
participants.171 Congress’s goal in enacting this section of Dodd–
Frank was to guarantee that margin and collateral requirements 
would not hinder end-users who utilize the market for pure 
hedging purposes.172 Congress wanted these participants to use 
funds for business investment and job creation, rather than 
margin requirements.173 Determining which participants utilize 
the market for these reasons and, consequently, whom to exempt 
from regulation is a problem.174 The next portion of this Note 
examines the end-user exception, which carries out this goal of 
Congress.  
V. End-User Exception to the Mandatory Clearing of Swaps 
Dodd–Frank gives the CFTC authority to adopt rules 
exempting certain swaps from the clearing mandate.175 Aiming to 
protect the American public by regulating systemic risk in the 
OTC market, the CFTC promulgated a rule defining the end-
user.176   
                                                                                                     
 171. See Dodd–Frank § 723(a)(3); Gogel, supra note 5, at 45–46 (discussing 
the Dodd–Frank regulations of the OTC swap market).   
 172. See 156 Cong. Rec. S5905 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. 
Blanche Lincoln) (stating that the legislation may not require some OTC market 
users to post margin, it will require them to satisfy public reporting 
requirements as set out in Dodd–Frank).  
 173. See John Carney, Will the CFTC Kill the End User Exemption?, CNBC 
NETNET (Oct. 4, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/39506763/Will_The_CFTC_ 
Kill_The_End_User_Exemption (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (discussing whether 
the CFTC has the authority to subject end-users to margin requirements) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 174. See Ariail, supra note 12, at 194 (“[T]he most problematic part of 
policing the end-user exemption . . . is distinguishing when an end-user is 
‘hedging or mitigating commercial risk’ rather than taking a speculative 
position in derivatives markets.”).   
 175. See End-User Exception to Mandatory Clearing of Swaps, 75 Fed. Reg. 
80747 (proposed Dec. 23, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 39) (“[T]he Dodd–
Frank Act provides the Commission with the authority to adopt rules governing 
the end-user clearing exception and to prescribe rules, issue interpretations, or 
request information from persons claiming the end-user clearing exception 
necessary to prevent abuse of the exception.”). 
 176. See id. 
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The end-user exception is limited to nonfinancial entities and 
does not completely eliminate their transactions from 
regulation.177 A nonfinancial entity includes users who do not 
hold investment positions for profit in the OTC market.178 The 
rule disqualifies any swap used for any speculative or trading 
purposes, or if used to hedge another swap.179 The rule requires 
that a nonfinancial entity claiming exempt status must disclose 
to the Commission its intention of claiming the exemption and 
how it generally plans to meet financial obligations.180 Some 
commenting on the proposed rule feel this regulation is 
burdensome and will not effectively increase price transparency 
in the swap market.181 Companies, like Shell, argue that overly 
aggressive regulation could undermine efficiencies appreciated in 
the OTC market and could distort pricing without promoting 
transparency.182  
A. Rule Design: Narrow Versus Broad 
By passing Title VII of Dodd–Frank, Congress wanted to 
increase transparency in the OTC market and decrease the 
threat of systemic risk.183 Regulators aim to promote public 
transparency in addition to transparency to regulators.184 The 
CFTC hopes that public transparency will improve the function of 
the OTC market, much as it has existing securities and futures 
                                                                                                     
 177. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A)(i) (as amended by 
Dodd–Frank).   
 178. See 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(C)(i) (providing a list of what users qualify as a 
financial entity).  
 179. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747 (explaining that the Commission finds all swaps 
held for appreciation in value to be speculative). 
 180. See id. (proposing that end-users notify the Commission each time the 
clearing exception is elected by providing specified information as set out in the 
swap data recordkeeping and reporting rules).   
 181. See Shell Letter, supra note 98, at 5 (explaining how compliance with 
data reporting for end-users will not provide an accurate portrayal of one’s 
exposure in the market).   
 182. See id. at 2 (stating that real time reporting requirements for swaps 
between an affiliate and a corporation do not promote the aims of Dodd–Frank).  
 183. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 166.  
 184. See Gary Gensler Testimony, supra note 7 (discussing the Dodd–Frank 
legislation and what it aims to promote in the OTC market).  
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markets.185 Although Title VII of Dodd–Frank regulates the vast 
and dangerous OTC market, Congress did not want the SEC and 
CFTC to regulate certain users.  
The end-user exception rule allows for commercial end-users 
to utilize the OTC derivatives market without the added cost of 
margin requirements and central clearing.186 Section 2(h)(7) of 
the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), as amended by Dodd–
Frank, provides: 
[T]hat a swap otherwise subject to mandatory clearing is 
subject to an elective exception from clearing if one party to 
the swap is not a financial entity, is using swaps to hedge or 
mitigate commercial risk, and notifies the Commission, in a 
manner set forth by the Commission, how it generally meets 
its financial obligations associated with entering into non-
cleared swaps.187 
Commentators to the end-user exception raised questions 
pertaining to a participant who does not qualify as a nonfinancial 
entity, but (a) cannot afford to meet hedging requirements, such 
as small banks, which are not systemically significant, and (b) 
uses the OTC market to hedge or mitigate risk, such as 
corporations’ affiliate companies.188 These commentators were 
concerned that they would not qualify for the end-user exemption 
and therefore must comply with mandatory clearing 
requirements or leave the market.189 
In response to these concerns, Congress introduced a bill that 
would require the CFTC to exempt inter-affiliate swaps from 
mandatory clearing.190 Inter-affiliate swaps are swaps that have 
                                                                                                     
 185. See id. 
 186. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747. 
 187. Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7) (as amended by Dodd–
Frank).  
 188. See Letter from Nat’l Rural Util. Cooperative Fin. Corp., to David A. 
Stawick, Secretary of the Comm’n, CFTC (Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter NRUCFC 
Letter] (addressing the issue of small financial entities utilizing the OTC 
market for reasons and in ways far different from large financial lenders, which 
would justify the small lenders inclusion in the end-user exception) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review); See Kraft Foods Letter, supra note 30, at 
9 (arguing that affiliate corporations, formed to act as a centralized hedging 
center to hedge exposed risk for an entire corporate group, should be included in 
the CFTC’s end-user definition). 
 189. See id.  
 190. See To Exempt Inter-affiliate Swaps from Certain Regulatory 
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a corporation on one side of the transaction and, on the other 
side, a party that is controlled or under common control of the 
corporation that is a counterparty to the transaction.191 This bill 
has yet to be enacted and may force the CFTC to broaden its 
narrowly proposed definition.  
The problem this poses is that the current design of the rule 
does not support a broad end-user definition. The CFTC defines 
end-user to include more participants, such as small banks, but 
does not subject the users to more regulatory requirements. 
Congress’s intention is to exempt end-users from the mandatory 
clearing of swaps to maintain low transaction costs, but imposing 
minimal regulatory requirements only hampers regulators’ 
efforts in creating a more transparent market.192 This Note 
argues that more disclosure is necessary for the end-users 
exempted from the mandatory clearing of swaps.  
B. Alternative Rule Design 
Based on the difficulty of pricing derivatives, the complexity 
of calculating margin requirements, and the uncertainty of 
financial innovation, can regulators effectively increase market 
transparency and decrease systemic risk in the OTC derivative 
market? This Note argues that more disclosure will help increase 
transparency, but that regulators will have difficulty in 
maintaining transparency with the ever changing land scape of 
financial innovation. 
                                                                                                     
Requirements Put in Place by the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 2779, 112th Cong. __(2012) (introduced on Aug. 
1, 2011 and currently extended for further consideration ending as of Mar. 8, 
2012). 
 191. See James Hamilton, House Ag Committee Approves Legislation 
Exempting Inter-Affiliate Swaps from Dodd–Frank Derivatives Requirements, 
Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation (Sept. 27, 2012, 2:44 PM), 
http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/house-ag-committee-exempts-inter. 
html (last visited Sept. 27, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 192. See infra Part V.B.1.  
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1. Alternative Approaches to OTC Derivatives Regulation 
The CFMA’s deregulation of the OTC derivatives market 
proved ineffective, as it is alleged to be a cause of the 2008 
financial crisis.193 By flying under the radar of regulators, the 
OTC market grew to an extraordinary size within the years 
leading up to the financial crisis.194 Title VII of Dodd–Frank aims 
to protect the American public from the systemic risk that the 
OTC market poses by increasing transparency and disclosure in 
the market.195 Part IV.B. and Part V examine Title VII’s efforts to 
achieve these goals. This Note now introduces alternative, 
perhaps better, approaches to derivatives regulation. 
First, as mentioned in Part IV.A, Lynn Stout proposes that 
regulators should treat OTC derivatives contracts as gambling 
contracts.196 Traditionally, speculative derivatives contracts were 
legally unenforceable wagers.197 Stout argues that because 
derivatives are technically bets on future market conduct, it 
makes sense for regulators to treat these contracts as gambling 
contracts.198 It encourages participants to be more careful in 
choosing counterparties and to take responsibility for their 
bets.199  
Second, voluntary reporting institutions, such as the ISDA 
and the Derivatives Policy Group mentioned in Part IV.B., allow 
                                                                                                     
 193. See Topham, supra note 4, at 147–49 (discussing how the CFMA’s 
deregulation of derivatives resulted in participants not being aware of the 
underlying risks associated with these instruments).  
 194. See id. at 148 (stating the notional amount of the derivatives market 
was estimated at $604 trillion in 2009, with major commercial banks holding 
positions that totaled $204 million).  
 195. See Schapiro, supra note 17, at 164 (listing the aims of the Dodd–Frank 
legislation). 
 196. See supra notes 147–50 and accompanying text (introducing Lynn 
Stout’s theory on regulating derivatives as gambling contracts).  
 197. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 30 (discussing 
how derivatives were regulated prior to the passage of the CFMA in 2000).  
 198. See id. at 30–31 (stating that, for centuries, speculative derivative 
contracts were treated as legally non-enforceable contracts just as gambling 
contracts due to the level of risk in the bet). 
 199. See id. at 32 (presenting the idea that speculative participants in the 
derivatives market are encouraged to choose counterparties wisely and to create 
a private market on which speculative participants trade, therefore minimizing 
systemic risk).  
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for participants to trade under standardized contracts.200 This 
enables a more concrete report of activity in the OTC market.201 
These institutions have made progress in reducing counterparty 
risk, but unfortunately could not prevent the 2008 financial 
crisis.202 
A third approach would regulate the conduct of users and not 
the specific instruments.203 This view looks to the major issues of 
the OTC market that regulators must address, namely 
counterparty risk and financial innovation.204 This approach 
seems similar to Dodd–Frank in that the legislation carves out an 
exception for end-users who utilize the market for hedging and 
requires speculators in the market to meet collateral 
requirements and mandatory clearing.205  
The final regulatory method builds on the last approach. It 
proposes that regardless of the conduct of the participant, all 
participants should adhere to disclosure requirements greater 
than just checking a box, as the current proposed rule sets out for 
end-users.206 The CFTC must set more stringent disclosure 
requirements so regulators can monitor the market for abuse of 
the end-user exception.207 Regulators should require end-users to 
                                                                                                     
 200. See supra notes 128–34 and accompanying text for an introduction of 
these institutions and their policy goals.  
 201. See id. 
 202. See Symposium, Regulatory Reform and the Future of the U.S. 
Financial System: An Examination of Dodd–Frank Regulation: Panel 1: 
Derivative Regulation, 7 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 439, 448–51 (2011) (discussing 
ISDA contracts and their use in the OTC market).  
 203. See Willa E. Gibson, Are Swap Agreements Securities or Futures?: The 
Inadequacies of Applying the Traditional Regulatory Approach to OTC 
Derivatives Transactions, 24 J. CORP. L. 379, 414 (1999) (introducing the idea to 
regulate OTC derivatives by conduct, i.e. speculation and hedging, and not by 
the type of instrument).  
 204. See id. at 412–15 (regulating conduct helps address major concerns of 
the OTC market while “achiev[ing] a balance between market efficiency and 
market integrity”).  
 205. See supra Part V.A.  
 206. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747; Letter from Michael Greenberger, Professor, 
Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law, to David A. Stawick, Sec., CFTC (Feb. 22, 2011) 
[hereinafter Greenberger Letter] (proposing to the CFTC that the end-user 
exception rule should enhance disclosure requirements to be more effective and 
align with the aims of Dodd–Frank). 
 207. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206, at 3 (stating that a “check-the-
box” approach is inadequate because it does not give regulators the proper 
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give more specific detail of how they will meet financial 
obligations, rather than just a general overview as the rule 
suggests.208 By adding this disclosure and other reporting 
requirements that provide a detailed outline of how end-users are 
hedging risk, regulators would be aware if end-users are 
adequately mitigating risk and not abusing the exception with 
speculation.209 
VI. Amendment to the End-User Exception 
The mandatory clearing of swaps aims to protect the 
American public from a financial crisis like that of 2008, but 
exempting end-users from other forms of regulation does not 
entirely meet the goals of Dodd–Frank. Exempting end-users 
from mandatory clearing is necessary for corporations to run 
their businesses effectively and efficiently by minimizing any 
potential devastating downside risk that could harm 
consumers.210 Additionally, if regulators require end-users to post 
margin and collateral, then the additional cost incurred would 
most likely be transferred to the consumer.211 This Note proposes 
that the CFTC amend the end-user exception to apply to a 
broader number of participants and, in doing so, require more 
stringent disclosure similar to that of the ISDA Master 
Agreement.  
                                                                                                     
information to monitor whether end-users are abusing the exception).  
 208. See 75 Fed. Reg. 80747. See also Greenberger Letter, supra note 206. 
 209. See Letter from Americans for Fin. Reform to Elizabeth M. Murphy, 
Sec., SEC (Feb. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Am. for Fin. Reform Letter] (presenting a 
proposal for enhanced disclosure and reporting for end-users claiming the 
exception to the mandatory clearing of swaps) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review); Greenberger Letter, supra note 206.  
 210. Christine Cuccia, Informational Asymmetry and OTC Transactions: 
Understanding the Need to Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 197, 198 
(1997) (discussing the ways in which corporations utilize the OTC market to 
hedge risk).  
 211. See Katharine Rose, Annuity Issuers Eye Dodd–Frank Act, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER/ LIFE & HEALTH FIN. SERV., Vol. 114 Issue 16, 12 (Aug. 23, 2010) 
(addressing concerns of insurers, such as MetLife and Harvard Financial 
Services Group, that an increased price of using derivatives would result in high 
costs to customers using financial services).     
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A. Proposal for End-User Disclosure 
Before this Note proposes how the CFTC should model end-
users’ disclosure requirements, it will briefly discuss why the 
other alternative approaches in Part V.B.1. do not sufficiently 
address the concerns posed by the OTC market. First, Lynn 
Stout’s theory to view OTC speculative contracts as gambling 
contracts does not meet the aims of Dodd–Frank. This approach 
would encourage investors to take responsibility for their risky 
behavior by making them individually responsible for any losses 
incurred on the contract.212 Unfortunately, this may not decrease 
systemic risk and promote transparency because it keeps 
regulators uninformed about market activity. Also, regulators 
have a difficult task in dissecting the difference between 
speculative and legitimate hedging contracts.213 Due to the 
market disruption that OTC derivatives allegedly caused in 2008, 
regulators cannot ignore the threat the market poses and must do 
more than just make derivatives legally unenforceable. 
The second approach to have nongovernmental institutions, 
such as the ISDA and the Derivatives Policy Group, continue in 
their efforts of promoting efficiency and transparency in the OTC 
market could be successful. Dodd–Frank focuses on the United 
States’ regulation of the OTC market, and not necessarily the 
international market, as do these other groups.214 While these 
institutions have made extraordinary improvement in the OTC 
market, it was not sufficient to prevent the 2008 crisis.215 
The third and fourth approaches introduced in Part V.B.1 
combine to make the best approach to regulating OTC 
derivatives, specifically end-users. This Note advocates 
maintaining an exemption of end-users from the mandatory 
clearing of swaps because they are not engaging in purely 
                                                                                                     
 212. See Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives, supra note 149, at 31–32. 
 213. See Kreitner, supra note 55, at 1135–36 (introducing the idea that the 
increasing popularity of OTC derivatives caused much discussion on the 
difficulty in distinguishing investment from gambling).  
 214. See generally Derivatives Policy Group, supra note 128; ISDA, ISDA 
Safe, Efficient Markets, ISDA 2011 BROCHURE, available at 
http://www.isda.org/uploadfiles/_docs/ISDA_Brochure_2011.pdf (explaining the 
ISDA’s purpose and who it aims to serve). 
 215. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (listing a number of suggested 
theories of how OTC derivatives contributed to the 2008 financial crisis). 
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speculative behavior. This mirrors the approach of regulating 
behavior in contrast to regulating a particular instrument.216 This 
Note proposes that the CFTC should define end-user broadly to 
enable more bona-fide hedging participants to claim the 
exemption. A broader exception would allow more users to 
effectively hedge against exposed risks for low transaction costs.  
The more broadly the CFTC defines an end-user, however, 
the greater the danger that the proposed regulation will not 
adequately protect against systemic risk and increase 
transparency.217 This stems from the idea that the more 
participants who qualify as end-users, and are thus subject to 
minimal regulation, the less effective the legislation will be in 
promoting transparency.218 More stringent disclosure 
requirements will help address this issue.219 Some end-users wish 
that their trading positions remain private so others will not 
mimic their contracts and make their hedging strategies 
ineffective.220 This concern does not change the necessity of 
regulators’ awareness of OTC market activity to assure that no 
participants are abusing the end-user exception.  
As discussed in Part V.A, the end-user exception provides 
that those claiming the exemption must only disclose that they 
intend to use the exemption and how they generally plan to meet 
financial obligations.221 Such a boilerplate disclosure statement 
will not adequately address Dodd–Frank’s aims to increase 
transparency and decrease systemic risk in the OTC market. This 
Note argues that disclosure and reporting requirements should 
resemble the terms of the ISDA Master Agreement, which is 
                                                                                                     
 216. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text. 
 217. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206 (explaining how not enhancing 
disclosure and reporting requirements will prevent regulators from adequately 
monitoring the market for abuse of the end-user exception).  
 218. See id. 
 219. See Am. for Fin. Reform Letter, supra note 209; supra notes 207–09 and 
accompanying text.  
 220. See Michael Sackheim & Elizabeth M. Schubert, Dodd–Frank Act Has 
Its First Birthday, but Derivatives End Users Have Little Cause to Celebrate, 2 
HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 8 (July 21, 2011), available at http://www. blr.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/07/Schubert-Derivatives_End_User.pdf (discussing end-
users’ fear that public disclosure would make trading strategies ineffective). 
 221. See supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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already utilized by many participants in the OTC market.222 For 
over 20 years, the ISDA has tackled the issue of promoting 
transparency and pricing efficiency in the OTC market while 
adapting to the constant changes in financial innovation.223 The 
CFTC could look to how the private sector promoted financial 
stability in the market and build off that model.  
The ISDA Master Agreement provides for increased 
documentation of parties’ transactions and for close-out netting in 
the event of default.224 To promote economic certainty, the Master 
Agreement allows for the nondefaulting party to elect an early 
termination date and potentially receive money if the party 
incurs a loss while entering into a new derivatives contract.225 
These provisions lower credit and legal risk for participants.226  
The CFTC could follow the standard form contract, which 
promotes low transaction costs, and require parties to provide 
additional disclosure of obligations or contract terms where they 
differ from the standard form.227 While the Master Agreement 
provides for disclosure of types of collateral thresholds, exposure 
calculations, payment schedules, netting, and standard contract 
terms, the CFTC must ensure that parties provide concrete 
specifics of their ability to meet financial obligations.228 Parties 
need to have adequate information to reduce counterparty risk, 
while regulators need the same data to moderate systemic risk. 
The regulation focuses on requirements and needs of the 
OTC derivatives market as it stands today. With the rapidly 
changing landscape of financial markets, especially the OTC 
derivatives market, regulatory schemes may quickly become 
                                                                                                     
 222. See Partnoy, supra note 131, at 6 (providing an overview of what the 
ISDA Master Agreement requires the parties to disclose). 
 223. See ISDA Safe, Efficient Markets, supra note 214 (describing the ISDA’s 
aim to promote efficiency, accuracy, and stability in the OTC market).  
 224. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 29 (discussing the 
concept of close-out netting, an important aspect of the ISDA Master 
Agreement). 
 225. See id.  
 226. See id. at 29–30.  
 227. See Partnoy, supra note 131, at 9 (stating that standard form 
derivatives documentation is cost reducing).  
 228. See PRACTICAL DERIVATIVES, supra note 96, at 27 (displaying the 
structure of the ISDA documentation at the relationship and transactional 
levels).  
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weak or ineffective.229 Because of the rapid growth of the OTC 
market and the complexity of financial innovation, regulators 
have difficulty in adequately addressing the concerns and risks 
this market poses.230 This Note argues that end-users should 
meet disclosure requirements as set out in the ISDA Master 
Agreement. It will allow regulators to guarantee that the market 
is more transparent to address the issues that they see fit.231  
VII. Conclusion 
The regulation of OTC derivatives has long been a 
controversial topic, as seen in the debate between Brooksley Born 
and Alan Greenspan in the late 1990s.232 In 2000, with the 
passage of the CFMA, regulators believed the best route was to 
deregulate the OTC market.233 Unfortunately, this led to a vast, 
complex, unregulated market that many claim played a role in 
the financial crisis of 2008.234 The financial crisis demonstrates to 
regulators that OTC derivatives carry a threat of systemic risk 
that needs to be controlled. 
This led Congress to pass Title VII of Dodd–Frank, which 
aims to address the threat of systemic risk by promoting 
transparency in the market.235 The CFTC proposed legislation 
that requires the mandatory clearing of swaps, which entails 
margin requirements that are quite costly to the parties of the 
transaction.236 Pursuant to Congressional intent, the CFTC 
proposed an exemption for nonfinancial entities who utilize the 
                                                                                                     
 229. See Iman Anabtawi & Steven Schwartz, Regulating Systemic Risk: 
Towards an Analytical Framework, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1361 (2011) 
(presenting the idea that it is difficult to regulate financial markets because 
they are rapidly changing and adapting to new innovations). 
 230. See, e.g., id. 
 231. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text (introducing the 
proposal of more stringent disclosure requirements to allow a broad end-user 
exception).  
 232. See supra notes 138–44 and accompanying text.  
 233. See supra notes 143–44 and accompanying text.  
 234. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text (introducing theories as to 
how the OTC market played a role in the 2008 financial crisis).  
 235. See OTC Derivatives Markets Act of 2009 Hearing, supra note 155, at 5. 
 236. See supra Part IV.B.  
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market to hedge underlying risk.237 This exemption is meant to 
maintain low transaction costs for these participants. While this 
is a legitimate concern for end-users, the CFTC should impose 
more stringent disclosure requirements than just checking the 
exemption box and generally disclosing how the party will meet 
financial obligations.238  
This proposal is to aid regulators in monitoring the end-users 
to determine who is validly claiming the exemption and who is 
abusing the exception by speculating.239 While this may increase 
costs to end-users to some extent, it will decrease the threat of 
systemic risk to the American public and promote transparency 
in the OTC market, the aims of Dodd–Frank. 
Foreseeing and preventing a financial crisis of the magnitude 
of the one in 2008 is an extremely difficult task. Financial 
innovation and the complexity of OTC derivatives make this task 
far more difficult. While the government is taking measures to 
address the systemic threat OTC derivatives pose, these efforts 
may soon prove ineffective. The knowledge of derivatives traders 
and the rapid change in financial innovation make regulating 
this market a daunting task.240 But this Note’s proposal of more 
stringent disclosure and reporting requirements can help 
increase market transparency which, in turn, makes regulating 
the OTC market easier. 
  
                                                                                                     
 237. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (stating Congress’s intent to 
exempt end-users from the mandatory clearing of swaps).  
 238. See supra Part VI.A. 
 239. See Greenberger Letter, supra note 206. 
 240. See e.g., Anabtawi & Schwartz, supra note 229.  
